The drowning of two Navy SEALs off Somalia was preventable, a Navy investigation finds

CNN
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A Navy investigation found that the drowning of two Navy SEALs during a sea interception attack off the coast of Somalia was avoidable due to a lack of adequate training and unclear guidelines for effective flotation.

During a nighttime intercept of a ship carrying Iranian weapons to Yemen, Chief Special Warfare Operator Christopher Chambers and Naval Special Warfare Operator 1st Class Nathan Ingram encountered heavy seas while attempting to board. Chambers, the platoon’s leading noncommissioned officer, fell from the side of the ship while Ingram immediately jumped into the water to help.

Loaded with equipment for the interception mission, the two Navy SEALs went down in less than a minute. Chambers was seen on the surface “only intermittently” for 26 seconds; Ingram was seen “intermittently” for 32 seconds.

“The entire tragic event passed in just forty-seven (47) seconds and two [Naval Special Warfare] “Officers were lost at sea,” the investigation found. “Stressed by the weight of each individual’s equipment, neither their physical capabilities nor additional emergency flotation devices, if activated, were sufficient to keep them afloat.”

The Naval Special Warfare Command’s findings represent the conclusion of a months-long investigation into how two members of one of the U.S. military’s most elite and best-trained teams drowned during a mission for which they were preparing.

“This incident, characterized by systemic problems, was preventable,” Gen. Michael “Erik” Kurilla, the commander of U.S. Central Command, wrote in his review of the investigation. Chambers and Ingram were promoted posthumously.

Naval Special Warfare SEAL Team Three deployed aboard USS Lewis B. Puller in December 2023. The team knew that its main task would be maritime interception. This month the team had carried out two successful daylight boardings of similar ships, called dhows, the first in calm seas and the second in heavy seas.

In early January 2024, the Navy began tracking a slow-moving dhow over a period of several days. SEAL Team Three began planning to intercept the ship around January 12th. Ultimately, the interception was brought forward a day after a weather review and operation drill.

At least one person involved in the operation, whose name is redacted in the investigation report, “expressed concern about postponing the timing of the operation because it felt rushed.” Additionally, “other crew members preferred to do it later in order to to have more time to prepare.”

Still, the research found that everyone in the group “responded ‘Okay’ and ‘Good to go’ when asked about their ability to execute.” The SEALs set out in a sea depth of about 6 to 7 feet, near the maximum altitude of 8 feet for such a nighttime operation. The conditions were so difficult that the boarding boat had to call three times in a row. Six SEALs were able to board the first two approaches.

However, the third approach was more difficult, the study found. Since the crew had left the wheelhouse, no one had controlled the dhow and the ship was swaying badly due to the weather. Chambers, 37, fell while trying to board and Ingram, 27, jumped into the water behind him.

The Navy conducted search and rescue operations for 10 days following the incident, covering a search area of ​​48,600 square miles. However, the teams were unable to recover the bodies of the two SEALs.

“In accordance with established naval policy, the salvage and salvage operation was not pursued further as the sea is considered a suitable and final resting place for the remains of naval service members,” the investigation report said.

The investigation concluded that the Naval Special Warfare Force Readiness Manual emphasizes the importance of buoyancy but does not provide specific guidance on what an effective buoyancy test entails.

Before the deployment, the SEALs conducted buoyancy tests in the waters off San Diego, investigators said, but after embarkation they were unable to complete the buoyancy tests.

The Navy emphasizes the need for “positive buoyancy” – the ability to stay afloat – for boarding team members. Other materials focus on the need for “neutral buoyancy,” the ability to stay upright in the water. Ultimately, it was up to individual team members to determine what type of lift was required for a mission and to configure it themselves. The lack of guidance led to “confusion and ineffective implementation.”

The SEALs also lacked sufficient training in the use of the Tactical Flotation Support System, an emergency flotation device, and it is unclear whether the two drowned SEALs even attempted to activate the system.

The inquiry recommended a series of steps to address the “systemic issues” that led to the two drownings, including formalizing buoyancy requirements for missions, assessing the need for a fail-safe flotation device and a review of life-saving equipment aboard Navy ships .